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Tredeau: Terry Stop and Frisk of Vehicle Occupant Extends to Passenger Com

CASENOTES

CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-Terry Stop and
Frisk of Vehicle Occupant Extends to Passenger
Compartment During Lawful Stop.
-

Michigan v. Long,
U.S. _, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983).

After observing David Long driving in excess of the speed limit and
swerving off the road, two Barry County deputies stopped him and investigated.' Long got out of the car and failed to answer promptly the officers'2
questions; the officers thought he was "under the influence of something".
Long returned to the car when asked about the vehicle registration, but
before he reached into the car, both deputies saw a hunting knife on the
floor of the car.3 One officer "Terry-frisked" Long; the other conducted a
flashlight search of the passenger compartment and discovered a small
leather pouch of marijuana under the armrest.4 A full search of the passenger compartment revealed no other contraband; however, the officers
impounded the car, and the subsequent search of the unlocked trunk revealed approximately seventy-five pounds of marijuana.' Long's motion
1. See Michigan v. Long, - U.S. - - 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3473, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 121011(1983).
2. Id at , 103 S. Ct. at 3473, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1211. The officers had to ask Long for
his license twice before he produced it, and it was only after their second request for his car
registration that Long started back to the car to retrieve it. See id at - 103 S. Ct. at 3473,
77 L. Ed. 2d at 1211.
3. See id at -, 103 S. Ct. at 3473, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1211; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 750.227 (1970) (MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.424 (Callaghan 1981)) (carrying concealed weapons without a license). "A person who shall carry a ... dangerous weapon except hunting
knives adapted and carried as such, concealed on or about his person, or whether concealed
or otherwise in any vehicle operated or occupied by him . . . shall be guilty of a felony ...."Id
4. See Michigan v. Long, - U.S.,
_, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3473, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 1211
(1983); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (describing patdown search of suspect's
outer clothes to insure officer safety).
5. See Michigan v. Long, - U.S.
_ 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3473, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 1211
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to suppress all of the marijuana was denied and he was subsequently convicted of possession of marijuana.6 The conviction was affirmed by the
Michigan Court of Appeals.7 The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, stating that Terry did not justify the search of the passenger compartment.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a police officer may conduct a protective search of a vehicle during a lawful detention of the vehicle's occupant.9 Held--reversed and remanded A Terry
"stop and frisk" of a vehicle occupant extends to the passenger compartment during a lawful stop.' °
The fourth amendment guarantees the right to be secure against unreasonble searches and seizures and that no warrants can be issued unless
there is probable cause." The warrant requirement and the probable
cause standard upon which warrants may be issued are the two safeguards
of a citizen's fourth amendment rights. 2 Although the fourth amendment

(1983). After the officers arrested Long, they searched the passenger compartment of the
vehicle, including the glove compartment. See id at - 103 S. Ct. at 3473, 77 L. Ed. 2d at
1211.
6. See id at - 103 S. Ct. at 3473, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1211.
7. See People v. Long, 288 N.W.2d 629, 632 (Mich. App. 1979) (calling the search a
"reasonable protective search under Terry"), rep'd, 320 N.W.2d 866 (Mich. 1982), rev'd and
remanded, - U.S. _, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983).
8. See People v. Long, 320 N.W.2d 866, 869-70 (Mich. 1982), rev'd and remanded __
U.S. - 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983).
9. See Michigan v. Long, - U.S. -, - 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3474, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 1212
(1983).
10. See id at - 103 S. Ct. at 3472, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1209.
I1. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id Probable cause is defined as "facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge
and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949). In addition to the probable
cause requirement, a warrant must be particular to the person, place, or thing named. See
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979); see also Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 10001 (1959) (general warrant expressly rejected by fourth amendment).
12. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (absent exceptions, search without warrant per se unreasonable). The probable cause standard guards against arbitrary
intrusion by setting guidelines that justify the intrusion. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444
U.S. 85, 95-96 (1979) (probable cause best compromise for accomodating opposing interests); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979) (probable cause representing "the
accumulated wisdom of precedent and experience"); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98,
102 (1959) (strict enforcment of probable cause standard since it protects both officer and
citizens). The warrant requirement protects citizens from arbitrary police action by placing
the judgment of a neutral and detached magistrate between the police and the citizen. See,
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has been respected and valued,' 3 courts have scrutinized the two safeguards and have developed exceptions to each. 14 The United States
Supreme Court has recognized that not all governmental instrusions are
equally invasive and has reasoned that the standard used to justify police
intrusions should reflect th;s variance. 15

e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (search without warrant per se unreasonable), cited with approvalin United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967) (except in certain intrusions, search of property unreasonable unless authorized by warrant); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499
(1958) (warrantless searches unreasonable absent certain exceptions). Additionally, the state
has the burden of proving that a warrantless search was necessary. See United States v.
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951) ("The burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the
need for it."). For an extensive discussion of the role of probable cause and warrant requirement of the fourth amendment, see generally Bloom, The Supreme Court And Its Purported
Preference For Search Warrants, 50 TENN. L. REV. 231, 236-39 (1983) (Supreme Court's
application of warrant requirement for searches); Comment, Dilution of the Probable Cause
Mandate Of The FourthAmendment--Michigan v. Summers, 16 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 805, 811
(1982) (discussing warrant and probable cause requirement and exceptions).
13. See, e.g., Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726-27 (1969) (fourth amendment prevents "wholesale intrusions" on citizen's security); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("[fourth amendment rights] are not mere second class
rights, but belong in the catalogue of indispensable freedoms."); United States v. Coates, 495
F.2d 160, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (fourth amendment as guarding sanctity of person). For an
overview of the fourth amendment, see I W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE
ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.1(a) (1978) (general review of fourth amendment);
Woody & Rosen, FourthAmendment, Viewed and Reviewed, 11 S. TEX. L.J. 315, 316 (1969)
(historical analysis of fourth amendment).
14. See I W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 4.1(a) (1978) (discussion of warrantless searches). One group of exceptions requires
probable cause, but no warrant. See Texas v. Brown,

-

U.S. __.....,

103 S. Ct. 1535, 1543-

44, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502, 515 (1983) (if officer lawfully in area and views suspicious object, it
may be seized); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976) (inventory search of
car permitted after impoundment); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)
(search of person valid as incident to lawful arrest because privacy interest already abated);
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (search of area within arrestee's immediate
control justified by police safety and preservation of evidence); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 298-99 (1967) (exigent circumstances of pursuing felon justify exception to warrant requirement); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-72 (1966) (potential for evidence
being destroyed justified warrantless seizure of blood of drunk driver). A second group of
exceptions does not require either a warrant or probable cause. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (consent must be voluntary); cf. United States v. Cortez,
449 U.S. 411, 422 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring) (border stop permitted if officers could
reasonably surmise criminal activity); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881
(1975) (while patrolling border, temporary detention allowed on less than probable cause);
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968) (acquiesence to authority not consent).
Absent an exception to the warrant requirement, or an exception to both the warrant and
probable cause requirements, warrantless governmental instrusions are per se unreasonable.
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
15. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15 (1968) ("No judicial opinion can comprehend the
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The United States Supreme Court announced the first variance to the
long standing probable cause standard in Terry v. Ohio. 16 A reasonable
suspicion standard was created in response to the need for a more lenient
standard used during brief, investigatory confrontations between officers
and citizens. 7 The Court held that an officer could temporarily detain a
suspect if the intrusion could be justified by articulable facts and inferences arising from the facts.' s During the stop, a frisk of the suspect's
outer clothes was permissible if the officer reasonably concluded that the
suspect might be armed and dangerous."9 The Court used reasonableness

protean variety of the street encounter."). The Court balanced the need to search with the
level of intrusion required by the search to determine whether the search was reasonable.
See id at 21.
16. 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). Officer McFadden observed three men walking by a store,
looking into the store window, conferring at the corner and then leaving the area. See id.at
6. He suspected them of "casing a job" and later approached them to ask their names. See
id.at 6-7. When they mumbled a response, McFadden patted down Terry's coat and felt
and retrieved a pistol. See id at 6-7. For extensive discussion of the Terry case, see, e.g.,
Tiffany, FourthAmendment andPolice-Citizen Confrontations, 60 J. CRIM. LAW, CRIMINOLoy 442, 452-53 (1969) (Terry and its impact on interrogation, need for more adequate
controls); Comment, Stop and Frisk, 63 N.W. U.L. REV. 837, 861 (1969) (stop and frisk as
"pragmatic reconciliation" of police and society); Note, Police May Conduct Limited Search
for Weapons in Course of FieldIn vestigation Without ProbableCauseforArrest, 21 VAND. L.
REV. 1109, 1115 (1968) (Terry as "expedient compromise" between law enforcement and
citizen's interests).
17. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,30 (1968). For an extensive discussion on the reasonable suspicion standard, see generally MODEL RULES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, STOP AND
FRISK Rule 202 (Project on Law Enforcement Policy and Rulemaking 1974) (listing factors
to consider in determining reasonable suspicion); I W. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES,
ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 13.4 (1982) (elements that could constitute reasonable suspicion); Bell, Factors Which Jusify a Stop andFrisk, 6 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP., June 1979,
at 3 (elements include demeanor, furtive gestures, and attempts to flee).
18. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). The Court held that a Terry-stop is a
seizure under the fourth amendment. See id at 16-17.
19. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). Initially, the officer may detain the person
and may conduct a brief, investigatory conversation at this point. See id at 22. During this
stop, the officer may exercise his authority to conduct a limited frisk of the suspect only if he
reasonably believes the suspect to be armed and dangerous. See id.at 30. Terry is a twostep process and each step has its own requirement to justify the intrusion. See M. HERMANN, SEARCH & SEIZURE CHECKLIST 27, 28 (1979). Thus, Terry may be used to justify an
initial detention based on reasonable suspicion. See United States v. McCann, 465 F.2d 147,
157-58 (5th Cir. 1972) (permitting limited detention to make investigatory inquiries), cert.
denied 412 U.S. 927 (1973). Additionally, Terry authorizes a weapon frisk of a person
reasaonably believed to be armed and dangerous. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64
(1968) (search only allowed if suspect believed to be armed and dangerous). For a detailed
discussion of the distinction between the stop and the frisk, see generally, 3 W. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT §§ 9.3-.4 (1978) (setting
out basis of stop and frisk); Dutile, Freezing the Status Quo in Criminal Investigations.- The
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as the controlling standard of the fourth amendment2" and balanced the
interest of police protection with the interest of the public to be free from
governmental intrusion. 2 I Numerous subsequent cases regarding policecitizen confrontations have echoed the Terry Court's reliance on the police
protection rationale2 2 and the limited protective search theory.2 3
While Terry addressed only a protective search of a suspect's outer
clothes,24 courts extended the Terry-frisk to include items closely associMelting of Probable Cause and Warrant Requirements, 21 B.C.L. REV. 851, 858 (1980) ("dual
intrusion being justified").
20. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968). The Court explained that it was impractical to require a warrant during an investigatory stop; therefore, the standard to justify the
intrusion would be relative to the reasonableness standard of the fourth amendment. See id
at 20; see also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967) (reasonableness as
ultimate standard). See generally J. HIRSCHEL, FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 39 (1969)
(empirical study of concept of reasonableness).
21. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968). The balancing test was first used in
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967) (balancing need to search against
invasion which search engenders); cf.Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 706 (198 1) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (Terry and border stops at international borders are "two isolated exceptions to the general rule that the fourth amendment itself has already performed the
constitutional balance between police objectives and personal privacy"). See generally
LaFave, "Street Encounters" And The Constitution.: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67
MICH. L. REv. 40, 57 (1969) (balancing test as "technique for establishing the quantum of
evidence needed").
22. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968) (important interest of police to secure
safety). Courts have repeatedly voiced concern that police should not face undue danger
while confronting suspects. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1977)
(requesting occupants to get out of car reasonable because of danger officer faces from passing traffic or suspect in car); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147-48 (1972) (police confrontation with suspect at night, high crime area and information that suspect armed justified
Terry-frisk); United States v. Coates, 495 F.2d 160, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (police must prepare for dangerous contingencies, but routine patdown searches invalid); cf United States v.
Green, 465 F.2d 620, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Wright, J., dissenting) (officer's interest in safety
not to be "transformed into a hunting license abrogating fourth amendment rights ..
").
See generally D. Mongiardo, Protective Searches, 3 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP., August
1976, at I (protective searches as part of exigency, plain view, and as separate exception).
23. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) ("scope of the search must be 'strictly tied
to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible"). Courts
have used the statement as a guideline by which to judge the scope of warrantless searches
based on both probable cause and reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., United States v. BrignoniPonce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975) (justifying brief detention based on reasonable suspicion of
suspected illegal aliens at international border as long as detention reasonably related in
scope to justification of initial intrusion); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 (1972)
(reaching into suspect's waistband for weapon based on reasonable suspicion was "limited
intrusion designed to insure [the officer's] safety"); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 76263 (1969) (search of area in suspect's immediate control upon arrest based on probable cause
follows Terry analysis of search being limited to what is justified by initial intrusion).
24. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). The limits of a Terry-frisk of a person
have been strictly construed to the patdown of the outer clothes. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois,
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ated with the person, such as luggage, duffelbags, and purses. 25 A permis26
sible Terry-frisk of these possessions ranged from a patdown of the item,
to reaching into an open bag, 27 and finally, to subjecting hand-carried luggage at an airport to a canine sniff.28 In each instance the stop was justified by the reasonable suspicion standard 29 and the subsequent search was

444 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1979) ("narrow scope" of Terry not extended beyond search for weapons); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65 (1968) (search "solely" patdown of outer clothing); United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699, 703 (10th Cir. 1982) (seizing bag of marijuana
from suspect's pants pocket invalid); cf. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147-48 (1972)
(police allowed to reach into suspect's waistband because informant and circumstances gave
reasonable fear for safety).
103 S. Ct. 2637, 2644, 77 L. Ed. 2d
25. See, e.g., United States v. Place, - U.S. _
110, 120-21 (1983) (seizure of luggage reasonably suspected of containing drugs subject to
canine sniff); United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 532, 534-35 (8th Cir. 1980) (search of suspect's duffelbag, not within reach, but behind door, valid for police protection); United
States v. Walker, 576 F.2d 253, 255-56 (9th Cir. 1978) (patdown and subsequent opening of
large purse after hard items were felt held reasonable), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1081 (1979).
See generally Comment, Demise Of The Probable Cause Requirement In Seizures Of Inanimate Objects, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 425 (1982) (reasonable suspicion as standard for
seizing luggage insufficient).
26. See United States v. Walker, 576 F.2d 253, 255-56 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1081 (1979). After twice commanding suspect to stop and watching the suspect reach
into her purse, the officer patted down the outside of the purse. See id at 255. Upon feeling
hard objects, the officer opened the purse. See id at 255. While some courts have allowed
Terry to support the search of a purse, the original scope of Terry was limited to the suspect's outer clothes. Compare id at 255-56 (reasonable for police to stop suspect under
Terry and to protect themselves by searching suspect's handbag) and United States v. Vigo,
487 F.2d 295, 298 (2d Cir. 1973) (search of purse within limits of Terry protective search)
with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (limiting search to patdown of outer clothes).
27. See United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 532, 533-34 (8th Cir. 1980). The duffelbag
remained inside a store while the suspect was brought outside. See id at 533. While one
officer frisked the suspect outside, the other reached back inside the door to get the duffelbag. See id at 533. The weapon was protruding from the top of the bag, covered with a
cloth. See id at 533-34. The officer grabbed the object and removed the cloth. See id at
533-34.
28. See United States v. Place, - U.S. _, - 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2644, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110,
120-21 (1983). The officers had a reasonable suspicion that the suspect was carrying drugs in
his luggage. See id at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2644, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 120. The officers seized the bags
and took them to another airport to subject them to a canine sniff test. See id at - 103 S.
Ct. at 2640, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 115. The sniff test was held not to be a search within the
meaning of the fourth amendment, but, in this case, the detention of the bags for ninety
minutes was outside the Terry-scope. See id at - 103 S. Ct. at 2645-46, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 12122. A canine sniff is valid if it occurs subsequent to lawful temporary detention. See United
States v. Klein, 626 F.2d 22, 26 (7th Cir. 1980). For a discussion on the use of dogs to
conduct searches, see generally Gilligan & Lederer, Searches By Dogs, 3 SEARCH & SEIZURE
L. REP., Jan. 1976, at I (discussing dog sniff searches, probable cause and expectations of
privacy).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Place, - U.S. __, _ 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2644, 77 L. Ed. 2d
110, 120 (1983) (when officer reasonably believes luggage contains drugs, temporary deten-
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validated because
of the danger posed to police by the suspect's accessibil30
ity to weapons.
Courts have recognized the increase in danger to police when confrontations involve vehicle occupants. 3 ' Initially, the Supreme Court held that
police could
order vehicle occupants to stand outside the car during a lawful stop. 32 Lower federal courts, utilizing the Terry rationale, extended the
protective frisk to authorize a search of the vehicle passenger compartment
for weapons after the occupant was out of the car.33 The courts based their

tion of luggage permissible under Terry), United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 532, 534 (8th
Cir. 1980) (information and police observation justified seizure of person); United States v.
Walker, 576 F.2d 253, 256 (9th Cir. 1978) (stop made in good faith belief that there was
criminal activity), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1081 (1979). Additionally, the Place Court announced that detention of luggage would be limited to the standard set out in Terry for
detention of suspects. See United States v. Place, - U.S. _, _ 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2645, 77 L.
Ed. 2d 110, 122 (1983). The recommended period of time to detain a person is twenty minutes. See MODEL CODE OF PREARRAIONMENT PROCEDURE § 110.2(1) (1975). For an extensive discussion of luggage seized on reasonable suspicion, see generally Comment, Fourth
Amendment Seizure: The Fifth Circuit Adopts A Restrictive Definition, 13 CUM. L. REV. 79,
87 (1982) (review of circuit courts' definitions of seizure); Comment, Seizing Luggage on Less
than Probable Cause, 18 AM. CiuM. L. REv. 637, 643 (1981) (reliance on Terry not applicable to seizure of luggage).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 532, 535 (8th Cir. 1980) (officers' safety
endangered by weapon in close proximity to suspect); United States v. Walker, 576 F.2d 253,
256 (9th Cir. 1978) (search justified by officer's need for protection), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1081 (1979); United States v. Vigo, 487 F.2d 295, 298 (2d Cir. 1973) (search of purse "normal, protective measure"). But see United States v. Place, - U.S...,__, 103 S. Ct. 2637,
2644-45, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110, 120-21 (1983) (Terry permits limited detention of bags on reasonable suspicion, but canine sniff not search for fourth amendment purposes).
31. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 n.3 (1972) (statistics showing 30% of
police shootings occur during police confrontations with suspects in vehicles), cited with approval in Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977); see also International Chiefs of
Police, Annual Law Enforcement Casualty Summary 2 (July 70-June 71), cited with approval
in United States v. Green, 465 F.2d 620, 624 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (additional data on police
shootings during vehicle stops).
32. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 111 (1977) (precautionary measure
of asking suspect to get out of car de minimis after lawful detention); see also Kremer, Right
Of Police To Order Traffic Violators Out Of Car, 5 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP., Feb. 1978, at
I (background and implication of Mimms); cf. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 (1972)
(officer could reach into occupant's waistband while still sitting in car based on Terry stop
and frisk). The Court considered the fact that the suspect was in a car, but the officer's fear
for his safety within the terms of Terry was the dominant justification. See id at 147-48. An
Adams type of search of vehicle occupants has been held valid by other courts. See United
States v. Vasquez, 634 F.2d 41, 42-43 (2d Cir. 1980) (as suspect reached under seat during
lawful stop, officers justified in making protective search); United States v. Beardslee, 609
F.2d 914, 916 (8th Cir. 1979) (officer reached into car to divert suspect's arm after observing
him holding gun), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1090 (1980).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1271 (10th Cir. 1982) (flashlight
search of cab of truck permissible when officer believes occupants armed and dangerous),
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reasoning on the potential for hiding weapons in the car, the suspect's access to weapons, and the danger of retaliation once a suspect was permitted
back in the car.34 The scope of protective searches was limited to reaching
under the front seat,35 patting down a coat on the front seat, 36 and conducting a flashlight search of the passenger compartment.3 7
In Michigan v. Long,3 1 the United States Supreme Court first announced
approval of a Terry-frisk of a vehicle passenger compartment while the
cert. denied, - U.S. _ 103 S. Ct. 1898, 77 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1983); United States v. Romero,
692 F.2d 699, 703 (10th Cir. 1982) (when suspect believed armed and dangerous, may search
car for weapons); United States v. Rainone, 586 F.2d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 1978) (placing
hands under front seat valid when officer had knowledge of prior violence in area), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 980 (1979).
34. See United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1271-72 (10th Cir. 1982) (reasonable to
conduct flashlight search of cab of truck because occupants could gain access to weapons if
they escaped from police control), cert. denied, - U.S. - 103 S. Ct. 1898, 77 L. Ed. 2d 286
(1983); United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699, 703 (10th Cir. 1982) (danger of suspect hiding weapon that could become accessible if he broke away from police or when he returned
to car); United States v. Wilkerson, 598 F.2d 621, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (occupants potentially able to reach into car and use hidden weapon); United States v. Rainone, 586 F.2d
1132, 1134-35 (7th Cir. 1978) (hidden weapon accessible to suspect if he breaks away from
police or possible motive to kill officer when he returns to his car), cert. denied 440 U.S. 980
(1979); United States v. Green, 465 F.2d 620, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (reasonable to conduct
limited protective search after seeing furtive gestures); cf Government of Canal Zone v.
Bender, 573 F.2d 1329, 1332 (5th Cir. 1978) (search of car invalid because officers did not
frisk occupants and therefore could not have reasonable fear for their safety and because
officers were closer to car than suspects).
35. Compare United States v. Rainone, 586 F.2d 1132, 1133 (7th Cir. 1978) (after
search of occupant and looking under seat, officer felt underneath and retrieved dynamite),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 980 (1979) and United States v. Green, 465 F.2d 620, 621 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (after observing furtive gestures, officer found pistol under driver seat) with Government of Canal Zone v. Bender, 573 F.2d 1329, 1330 (5th Cir. 1978) (reaching under front
seat and retrieving frisbee with marijuana held invalid) and People v. Superior Court of
Yolo County, 478 P.2d 449, 454-57, 91 Cal. Rptr. 729, 735-42 (ambiguity inherent in furtive
gestures). For a discussion of furtive gestures and their role in justifying a stop and frisk, see
I W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 3.6(d)
(1978) (discussion of Yolo County); 1 W. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND
CONFESSIONS § 13.4(b)(2) (1982) (noting that furtive gestures often occur during vehicle
stops); Bell, Factors Which Jusiy .4 Slop And Frisk, 6 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP., June
1979, at 3 (listing elements of stop and frisk).
36. See United States v. Wilkerson, 598 F.2d 621, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (patting down
coat which "appeared to be wrapped around something" valid); cf. United States v. Walker,
576 F.2d 253, 255-56 (9th Cir. 1978) (patdown of purse, followed by opening of purse after
hard object felt, valid), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1081 (1979).
37. See United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1271-72 (10th Cir. 1982) (flashlight
search of truck cab valid when reasonably believe occupant to be armed and dangerous),
cert. denied, - U.S. __ 103 S. Ct. 1898, 77 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1983). See generally G. Miller,
Visual Searches, 3 SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP., Feb. 1976, at I (discussion of plain view,
surveillance, and aided observations).
38. - U.S. - 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983).
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occupant was lawfully detained.3 9 The search must be limited to places

where a weapon could be secreted and must be based on a reasonable
belief that the suspect is armed and dangerous and may have access to
weapons.' The Court relied on three justifications for the search. 4' First,
the Court reaffirmed the need for police protection when confronting suspects reasonably believed to be armed and dangerous.4 2 Second, the Court
emphasized that dangers surrounding confrontations are increased when

the suspect is in a vehicle. 43 Finally, the Court relied upon the hazard that

39. See id. at __ 103 S. Ct. at 3480, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1221. There was a secondary issue
regarding the United States Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review the case. The majority
set out a procedure by which state courts could establish that their opinions were based on
independent state grounds thereby precluding judicial review by the United States Supreme
Court. See id. at __ 103 S. Ct. at 3476-77, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1214. The majority reaffirmed the
need to maintain the independence of state courts and to avoid issuing advisory opinions.
See id at 103 S. Ct. at 3475, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1214. The Court announced that when a
case relies on federal law exclusively or in part for its holding, and the sufficiency and independence of state law are not clearly established, the opinion will be considered to have been
decided because federal law so required. See id. at 103 S. Ct. at 3476, 77 L. Ed. 2d at
1214. Should the state court choose to rely on federal law only as precedent equivalent to
any other jurisdiction's precedent and not as a controlling factor, then the court need only
state this. See id at 103 S. Ct. at 3476, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1214. The majority reasoned that
the reliance on the Michigan State Constitution was not "sufficiently independent from the
state court's interpretation of federal law" and that the decision primarily relied on federal
law. See id. at _, 103 S. Ct. at 3471, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1216. In a separate concurring opinion,
Mr. Justice Blackmun admitted jurisdiction over the case, but because of the potential for
advisory opinions, he disapproved of the majority's "presumption ofjurisdiction." See id. at
- 103 S. Ct. at 3483, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1223 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Mr. Justice Stevens,
writing for the dissent, held that the reliance on the state constitution was adequate state
grounds and rejected the majority's presumption that the state grounds were determined by
federal laws unless the court indicates otherwise. See id. at 103 S. Ct. at 3489, 77 L. Ed.
2d at 1231 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent reasoned that this was a case in which the
state of Michigan was merely offering greater protection than would be offered by the
United States Supreme Court, and which "offended no federal interest whatever." Id at __,
103 S. Ct. at 3490, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1233 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. See id. at __ 103 S. Ct. at 3480, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1220. Reasonable belief is the same
standard initially set out in Terry, wherein the officers' fear of a suspect must be justified by
articulable and specific facts and the inferences from those facts. See Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
41. See Michigan v. Long, - U.S. - 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3480, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201,
1219-20 (1983).
42. See id. at __, 103 S. Ct. at 3478-79, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1217-18. The Court used the
balancing test and the reasonableness standard used in Terry to justify police protection
actions. See id at 103 S. Ct. at 3479, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1217-18. The Long majority noted
that the Terry Court anticipated the future limitations on a protective search would evolve
in terms of the facts and circumstances of each case. See id. at _ 103 S. Ct. at 3479, 77 L.
Ed. 2d at 1218; see also, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968).
43. See Michigan v. Long, - U.S. _ _, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3479, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201,
1218-19 (1983). The majority cited Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) and Adams
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exists when the suspect is not armed, but when he has access to an area in
which a weapon could be obtained. 44 The Court concluded that, in the
interest of police safety, 45the search was not unreasonable in light of the
facts and circumstances.
Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent, objected to the search of the
vehicle passenger compartment because it exceeded the scope of the original Terry-frisk. I Initially, the dissent asserted that the majority relied on
the justifications of a search incident to arrest to create a Terry-frisk area
rule and, therefore, ignored the significant differences between the two
types of searches."7 Secondly, the dissent disapproved of the majority's
failure to define the limits of an area search, labelling the search different
in both kind and degree from a Terry intrusion.48 Finally, the dissent be-

v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) to demonstrate the Court's concern for police safety in
confronting suspects in vehicles. See Michigan v. Long, - U.S. - - 103 S. Ct. 3469,
3479, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 1218-19 (1983). The Court emphasized this concern noting that
30% of police shootings occur during police confrontations with a suspect in an automobile.
See id at - n.13, 103 S. Ct. at 3479 n.13, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1219 n.13.
44. See Michigan v. Long, - U.S. - - 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3480, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 1219
(1983). The Court used the reasoning from Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) that
the area within the suspect's immediate control may be searched to eliminate threats to
officers. See Michigan v. Long,

-

U.S. __, _, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3480, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 1219

(1983).
45. See Michigan v. Long, - U.S. - - 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3480-81, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201,
1220-21 (1983). The Court remanded the issue of marijuana found during the trunk search.
See id at - 103 S. Ct. at 3482, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1222-23. The Michigan Supreme Court had
suppressed the trunk marijuana as fruit of an illegal search; consequently, they did not address the issue in their opinion. See People v. Long, 320 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Mich. 1982), rev'd
and remanded_ U.S. _ 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983). The United States
Supreme Court, having validated the initial search, remanded the issue for determination in
light of South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) and United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798 (1982). See Michigan v. Long,

-

U.S. _,

__

103 S. Ct. 3469, 3482, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201,

1222-23 (1983).
46. See Michigan v. Long, - U.S. 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3484, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201,
1224-25 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. See id at - 103 S. Ct. at 3485, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1225-26 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The dissent noted the difference between the two types of searches as stated in Terry. See id
at - 103 S. Ct. at 3485, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1225-26 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Terry-frisk
was a brief intrusion limited to a search for weapons, whereas the search incident to an
arrest is the first stage of prosecution which leads to further interference with a suspect's
freedom. See id at __ 103 S. Ct. at 3485, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1226 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The
dissent declared that the distinction between a Terry stop and frisk and a search incident to
arrest was used by the Court to determine that Terry should not establish the limits of a
search incident to arrest. See id at - 103 S. Ct. at 3485, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1226 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
48. See Michigan v. Long, - U.S.
103 S. Ct. 3469, 3486-87, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201,
1227-28 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (potentially weapon could be hidden in variety of
places in vehicle).
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lieved that the vehicle frisk was the type of intrusion normally associated
with arrest and, therefore, the majority should not have used the balancing
test to determine if the search was reasonable.4 9
The opinions in Long restate the standing controversy over whether to
extend the protective search authorized by Terry to a reasonable area or to
limit the search to a patdown of the suspect's clothes." Both the language
in Terry" and subsequent case law indicate that the Long Court correctly
expands the scope of the protective search to include areas beyond the
suspect's outer clothes. 2 Although the Long Court follows the Terry reasoning, the limitations on the Long vehicle frisk are not as clearly defined
as the original Terry stop and frisk standards. 3 Having seen the Terry

49. See id at - 103 S. Ct. at 3487, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1229 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Arrests are justified by probable cause; whereas, the balancing test is applied to intrusions
that fall short of an arrest. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979). In applying the balancing test the interest of the government and the individual are balanced to
determine if the intrusion is justified. See, e.g., id.at 212 (narrow intrusions of Terry and
progeny governed by balancing test); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (balancing test
applied to stop and frisk); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967) (balance
need to search against intrusion present in administrative searches).
50. See, e.g., United States v. Place, - U.S. _ __ 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2644, 77 L. Ed. 2d
110, 120 (1983) (detaining luggage and permitting canine sniff based on reasonable suspicion); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (during vehicle detention, request to
exit car de minimis compared to initial step); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147-48
(1972) (reach into waistband to search for gun). The alternative view advocates a more
narrow reading of Terry. See, e.g., United States v. Place,

-

U.S.

_

__ 103 S. Ct. 2637,

2648, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110, 125 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (Terry permits only "extremely
limited searches"); Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 113 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Terry intrusion related to reason for stop, does not allow intrusion unrelated to stop);
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 158 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Terry-frisk only
permitted if suspect dangerous).
51. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1968) (stating narrowness of question and that
case is not to "canvass in detail the constitutional limitations"); see also id at 29 (limitations
on protective search decided on facts and circumstances).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1271-72 (10th Cir. 1982) (flashlight search of truck cab allowed because suspects could have access to weapons), cert. denied, -

U.S. ____,
103 S.Ct. 1898, 77 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1983); United States v. Rainone, 586 F.2d

1132, 1133 (7th Cir. 1978) (permitting officer to reach under front seat of car), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 980 (1979); United States v. Wilkerson, 598 F.2d 621, 623 (1978) (permitting
patdown of coat on front seat of car).
53. Compare Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) ("We merely hold today that where a
police officer observes. . . he is entitled for the protection of himself or others in the area, to
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing .. ")with Michigan v. Long, U.S. - - 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3480, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 1220 (1983) ("the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed
or hidden .. ").For a discussion of the scope of a protective search, see LaFave, "Street
Encounters" and the Constitution.: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 40,
84 (1969).
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stop and frisk extend beyond its original guidelines,5 4 the Long majority
should anticipate that Long, too, will potentially expand beyond what is
now permitted. 5
By failing to clearly define the limits of a vehicle frisk, the Long decision
becomes more vulnerable to unintended extensions56 and leaves police unsure about implementing the search. 7 For example, the Long Court does
not address whether a suspect may be forced to open an unlocked glove
compartment in which a weapon could easily be hidden.58 In the past,
courts have maintained strict limitations on a search without compromis54. Compare Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 30 (1968) (search limited to suspect's outer
clothing) with United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 532, 534-35 (8th Cir. 1980) (Terry protective search applied to duffelbag behind door, valid to retrieve gun protruding from bag) and
United States v. Rainone, 586 F.2d 1132, 1136 (7th Cir. 1978) ("[W]e do not view Terry
searches as necessarily restricted to the outer clothing of the suspect."), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
980 (1979).
55. See Comment, Dilution of the Probable Cause Mandateof the Fourth Amendment-Michigan v. Summers, 16 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 805, 820 (1982) (Terry balancing test potentially a "vehicle for the wholesale dilution of probable cause and warrant requirement"); cf.
Comment, Extension of Terry Search to Nearby Automobile-- United States v. Rainone, 13
SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1101, 1117 (1979) (expanding Terry stop and frisk undermines citizens'
fourth amendment rights). But see Dutile, Freezing the Status Quo In Criminal Investigations." The Melting Of Probable Cause And WarrantRequirements, 21 B.C.L. REV. 851, 871
(1980) (Terry may have effect of closer scrutiny of police-citizen confrontations such as border stops, random vehicle checks, and identity statutes).
56. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("There have been
powerful hydraulic pressures throughout our history that bear heavily on the court to water

down constitutional guarantees ....

); see also A.

BARTH, THE PRICE OF LIBERTY

20

(1961) ("Liberty, therefore, requires a dual protection. It required ... limitation of governmental authority to prevent an extension of authority beyond the need for it.").
57. Cf. G. Reamey, The Application of Stop and Frisk To Vehicles in Texas 35 (April
20, 1981) (unpublished manuscript) (officers have right to know extent of permissible
searches). It has been recommended that police departments provide guidelines for officers.
See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 104 (1967) ("Police departments
should develop and enunciate policies that give police personnel specific guidance for the
common situations requiring exercise of police discretion."). An example of how police can
be informed of recent judicial decisions is through subscription to a trade journal. See 31
TEXAS POLICE JOURNAL (Texas Police Association) (Sept. 1983) (capsule summary of Long
case in Police Legal Digest).
58. Cf. Michigan v. Long, - U.S. - . 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3480, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 121920 (1983). Another ambiguous circumstance occurs during which the suspect and the officer
are at the back of the car with the trunk slightly open. Clearly the suspect has access to
potentially dangerous weapons hidden in the trunk. Under Long, however, the officer may
not search that area. Cf. id at - 103 S. Ct. at 3480, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1219-20 (permit search
of passenger compartment where weapon could be secreted). See generally G. Reamey, The
Application of Stop and Frisk To Vehicles in Texas 35 (April 20, 1981) (unpublished manuscript) ("[E]very police officer and every citizen has the right to know precisely how [vehicle
frisks] are justifiable and what limits govern their application.").
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ing its protective function.5 9 Accordingly, the Long Court could have cre-

ated an effective and minimally intrusive vehicle frisk by using limitations
previously established by lower courts6" or by identifying a point beyond
which the officer may not search. 6 '
Courts have previously validated cursory searches of vehicles in order to
secure the officer's safety when it is genuinely in jeopardy. 62 While the
Long decision may be a valid extension of the Terry protective search, the
facts do not demonstrate that the officers honestly feared for their safety.6 3

59. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 96 (1979) (search invalid because no reasonable fear for safety); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968) (must have reasonable
suspicion of danger before officer allowed to search suspect); United States v. Romero, 692
F.2d 699, 703 (10th Cir. 1982) (reaching into pants pocket was not justified when no suspicion of weapon). In none of the instances were officers exposed to undue danger. See
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93 (1979) (officers had no reason to think suspect would
harm them); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968) (watching suspects talk to drug
users places no fear in officer); United States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699, 703 (10th Cir. 1982)
(officer knew there was no weapon in pants pocket).
60. See, e.g., United States v. Wilkerson, 598 F.2d 621, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (initial
search limited to suspicious jacket on front seat of car); United States v. Rainone, 586 F.2d
1132, 1136 (7th Cir. 1978) (limited to area within immediate control, surface of front and
back seats and under front seat), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 980 (1979); United States v. Green,
465 F.2d 620, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (search under driver's seat of vehicle with door opened to
which driver will return).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Place, - U.S. - - 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2645-46, 77 L. Ed.
2d 110, 122 (1983) (seizure of bags and canine sniff reasonable, but detaining for ninety
minutes rendered detention unreasonable); United States v. Rainone, 586 F.2d 1132, 1135
(7th Cir. 1978) (search did not include trunk, under the hood, beneath back seat or chassis),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 980 (1979); United States v. Green, 465 F.2d 620, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(no search of trunk, glove compartment or back seat).
62. See, e.g., United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1271 (10th Cir. 1982) (police had
information that suspect, armed and dangerous and wanted for murder, would be in vehi103 S. Ct. 1898, 77 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1983); United States v.
cle), cert. denied, - U.S. Rainone, 586 F.2d 1132, 1133 (7th Cir. 1978) (officers had knowledge that suspect part of
violent intra-family feud), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 980 (1979); United States v. Green, 465 F.2d
620, 621-22 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (furtive gestures observed gave rise to reasonable suspicion of
danger).
63. See Respondent's Brief at 14-16, Michigan v. Long, - U.S. _, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77
L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983). The Supreme Court considered a number of factors to justify the
reasonableness of the officers' fear, such as it was a rural area, late at night, the suspect had
been speeding, driving carelessly and had an accident, the officers thought he was "under the
influence of something", there was a large knife in the car, and the leather pouch discovered
could have been a weapon. See Michigan v. Long,

-

U.S. _ __, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3473, 77

L. Ed. 2d 1201, 1210-11 (1983). The Respondent's Brief urged that most of Barry County is
rural and isolated, the late hour does not make people more violent, traffic violations are
common, Long's appearance could have been due to the immediately preceding accident,
and it was a closed hunting knife in the car. See Respondent's Brief at 16, Michigan v.
Long, - U.S. _ 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983). The Respondent's Brief adds
that Long was cooperative, never threatened the officers, and that the officer testified only to
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Although the hunting knife and other potential hidden weapons were
clearly threatening factors,' 4 the facts also indicate that the knife was legal,
the suspect was cooperative, showed no animosity toward the officers and
did not have any weapons on his person. 6 Lower courts have held previous vehicle frisks to be reasonable for fourth amendment purposes specifically because the police confronted dangerous situations;6 6 absent the
police protection justification, vehicle frisks have been found unreasonable.67 Consequently, the Long Court diminishes the citizen's fourth
amendment protections by allowing Long's ambiguous facts to68support the
conclusion that such an extensive vehicle frisk is reasonable.
"concern" about Long. Seeid at 14-16; Michigan v. Long, - U.S.

-, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L.
Ed. 2d 1201 (1983).
64. See Michigan v. Long, - U.S. - - 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3481-82, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201,
1220-21 (1983) (suspect may break from custody and use weapon against police).
65. See Respondent's Brief at 15-16, Michigan v. Long,

-

U.S. ___,103 S. Ct. 3469, 77

L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983). Compare Michigan v. Long, - U.S. _, _ 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3481, 77
L. Ed. 2d 1201, 1220-21 (1983) (suspect with knife on floor of car) with United States v.
Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1271 (10th Cir. 1982) (suspect believed to be armed and dangerous
and wanted for murder), cert. denied. -

U.S. _ 103 S. Ct. 1898, 77 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1983).

One court has held that although a suspect's furtive gestures could justify the officers' fear
for their safety, the court added that "the fear must be a reasonable one." See United States
v. Green, 465 F.2d 620, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The Green court emphasized that the reasonable fear must be based on the objective standard, as mandated in Terry. See id at 623. In
contrast, the Long deputies testified only to their "concern" about Long and they did not
handcuff him until after the marijuana was found in the trunk. See Respondent's Brief at
15, Michigan v. Long, - U.S. _ 103 S. Ct. 3469, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201 (1983).
66. See United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1271 (10th Cir. 1982) (suspect wanted
for murder, believed to be heavily armed, officers had seen suspect's residence containing
weapons), cert. denied, -

U.S. _ 103 S. Ct. 1898, 77 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1983); United States v.

Romero, 692 F.2d 699, 701-03 (10th Cir. 1982) (information that suspect carrying 40-60
pounds of marijuana resulted in valid search of van for hidden weapons); United States v.
Wilkerson, 598 F.2d 621, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (danger eliminated by frisk of coat on front
seat of car); United States v. Rainone, 586 F.2d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir. 1978) (officer's personal
knowledge of intra-family feud with violence), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 980 (1979); United
States v. Green, 465 F.2d 620, 623-24 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (furtive gestures led officers to believe
suspect armed).
67. See Government of Canal Zone v. Bender, 573 F.2d 1329, 1331-32 (5th Cir. 1978)
(search of vehicle invalid because no articulable danger posed to officers), cited with approval
in United States v. Ullrich, 580 F.2d 765, 769-70 (5th Cir. 1978) (suspect's action justified
officer's fear and validated search of suspect in car).
68. Cf Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
("Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons . . . of
every arbitrary government."); Comment, Dilution of the Probable Cause Mandate of the
Fourth Amendment--Michigan v. Summers, 16 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 805, 820 (1982) (narrow
scope of "limited intrusion" must be maintained or could lead to whole dilution of probable
cause and warrant requirement); Comment, Extension of Terry Search to Nearby Automobile-United States v. Rainone, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1101, 1117-18 (1979) (extending
Terry frisk to vehicle places untoward discretion in police, confuses Terry frisk with search
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. While the Long vehicle frisk is a significant expansion of the original
Terry-frisk of a suspect, 69 the vehicle frisk necessarily becomes a new category of warrantless vehicle searches, and joins other exceptions such as the
vehicle exception and the vehicle search incident to arrest.70 The vehicle

incident to arrest, and consequently undermines guarantees of fourth amendment). Many
commentators have addressed the impact that unbridled police discretion could have on
fourth amendment rights. See A. BARTH, THE PRICE OF LIBERTY 35 (1961).
Zeal leads policemen, at times, into a dangerous disregard of individual rights for the
sake of what they believe to be the protection of society. This is why nothing is more
fundamental to freedom than a recognition that the police . . . must always be kept
under careful scrutiny and subjected to exacting judicial supervision. The relaxation of
such scrutiny and supervision invites corruption.
Id at 35; see also Comment, Extension of Terry Search to Nearby Automobile-- United States
v. Rainone, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1101, 1117 (1979) (extending stop and frisk beyond Terry
limits gives police untoward discretion and endangers fourth amendment rights). Commentators have suggested alternatives to police discretion in search and seizure cases. See generally L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE, JR. & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 200 (1967)

(discussing whether policy decisions should be responsibility of legislature, judiciary, or police); LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 987, 993 (1965) (effect of judges' decisions
on police).
69. See Michigan v. Long, - U.S. -.. , 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3484, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 1224
(1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("nothing in Terry authorized police officers to search a
suspect's car based on reasonable suspicion."). Terry discussed only the search of the person, while Long validated a permissible vehicle frisk. Compare Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,30
(1968) ("We merely hold today that ... [a police officer may] conduct a carefully limited
103 S. Ct. 3469,
search of the outer clothing.
...) with Michigan v. Long, - U.S. -_
3480, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 1220 (1983) ("search of passenger compartment of an automobile,
").
limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden ..
70. See Wilson, WarrantlessAutomobile Searches, I SEARCH & SEIZURE L. REP., Sept.

1974 at I (discussion of Carroll, Robinson and Coolidge), Comment, Search and Seizure.From Carrollto Ross, The Odyssey of the Automobile Exception, 32 CATH. L. REV. 221, 22559 (1982) (review of automobile searches). Police may conduct warrantless searches of vehicle passenger compartments under four justifications. (1) The Vehicle Exception. The vehicle exception requires probable cause to search the car. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (warrantless search of car and containers in which object of search may
be hidden valid upon determination of probable cause); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,
52 (1970) (authority to conduct warrantless search of vehicle does not cease after car in
police custody); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (warrantless search justified because of vehicle's inherent mobility). (2) The Search Incident to Arrest Exception.
Following the lawful arrest of a vehicle occupant, an officer may search the passenger compartment. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (subsequent to arrest, search of
passenger compartment valid because within arrestee's immediate control). (3) Inventory
andImpoundment Exception. While a vehicle is lawfully impounded, officers may conduct
an inventory of the vehicle. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976)
(search justified to protect property in car, prevent false property claims against police, and
guard police from potential danger). (4) Plain View Exception. Officer may seize contraband
_ 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1543-44, 75 L. Ed.
seen inadvertently. See Texas v. Brown, - U.S. 2d 502, 515 (1983) (if lawfully in area and view suspicious object, it may be seized); cf.
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exception is used to search for contraband or evidence, 7 whereas a vehicle
search incident to arrest is used both as a police protective measure and to
preserve evidence.7 2 In contrast, the Long vehicle frisk addresses only the
need for police safety during temporary confrontations with suspects in
vehicles.7 3 Additionally, previous warrantless vehicle searches were based
on probable cause or a valid exception to the probable cause requirement,
whereas Long permits a reasonable suspicion standard to justify the vehicle frisk.7 4 Although the Long frisk is a type of warrantless vehicle search,
the reasoning and goals of the search are clearly distinct from both the
vehicle exception and the vehicle search incident to arrest exception.75
The failure of the Long Court to label and distinguish the new vehicle frisk

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468-70 (1971) (plain view must be inadvertent
discovery from position where officer may lawfully view contraband).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (warrantless search "defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe
that it may be found"); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 47-48 (1970) (probable cause
existed to search for guns and money, incriminating evidence of robbery); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) (probable cause existed for bootleg whiskey). See generally
2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 7.2
(1978) (vehicle searches when evidence is object of search).
72. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457-58 (1981). The Court determined that
the passenger compartment was an area within the arrestee's immediate control, as defined
in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969), and noted that the principles of Chimel
regarding scope are not altered. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.3 (1981). See
generally 1 W. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS §11.1(a)
(1982) (search of vehicle incident to arrest).
73. See Michigan v. Long,

U.S. -

-

103 S. Ct. 3469, 3480, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201,

-

1219-20 (1983). The three reasons on which the Court based its holding directly refer to
police safety, including the need for police to perform protective searches, the danger of
vehicle stops, and the danger of weapons in a vehicle. See id. at __, 103 S. Ct. at 3480, 77 L.
Ed. 2d at 1219-20. But cf. 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE

§ 7.1(c) (1978) (noting instances in which officers cause suspect to
move toward car to justify search).
FOURTH AMENDMENT

74. Compare Texas v. Brown,

-

U.S.

.

__, 103 S. Ct. 1535, 1543-44, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502,

515 (1983) (probable cause not required to seize object if subject of plain view discovery)
and United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (probable cause required to justify
search under vehicle exception) and New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (search
only conducted incident to lawful arrest) and South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 36971 (1976) (search conducted because of three justifications, held reasonable for fourth
amendment purposes) with Michigan v. Long, -

U.S...__, _,...

103 S. Ct. 3469, 3481, 77 L. Ed.

2d 1201, 1220-21 (1983) (search of vehicle interior based on reasonable suspicion valid).
75. Compare Michigan v. Long, - U.S. __ 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3480, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1202,
1219-20 (1983) (protection of police from potential danger of roadside stops) with United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (if probable cause exists for vehicle, warrantless
search of entire vehicle and any containers which may hold object of search valid) and New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457-60 (1981) (search of vehicle interior incident to arrest valid
for police protection and preservation of evidence).
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could cause confusion in lower courts and law enforcement. 76 The application of different types of warrantless vehicle searches has been complex
and uncertain 77 and the danger of confusing the new vehicle frisk with
other types of searches is great. 71 Courts must exercise caution by recognizing that the purposes and limitations of the Long vehicle frisk are significantly more narrow than any other warrantless vehicle search.79
The Long vehicle frisk provides another police protection device during
police-citizen confrontations. By authorizing a search of the vehicle passenger compartment for weapons, the Court has eliminated the danger of
weapons hidden in cars and still accessible to suspects. The search, however, requires the citizen to surrender the fourth amendment protections
guaranteed by the warrant and probable cause requirements because a vehicle is subjected to a search based on the more lenient standard of reasonable suspicion. The subjectivity and inconsistency implicit in the Court's
determination of reasonableness is a "slender reed" on which to rest con-

76. See G. Reamey, The Application Of Stop And Frisk To Vehicles in Texas 34 (April
20, 1981) (unpublished manuscript) (courts should define scope of vehicle frisk); cf. New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 470 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (raising questions unanswered by Belton's bright-line rule and the failure of majority to give police guidance).
77. Compare United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (scope of warrantless vehicle search determined by the object of the search and where it could be hidden, expressing
inconsistency with Arkansas v. Sanders, but adhereing to holding of Sanders) with Arkansas
v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764-65 (1979) (warrantless search of luggage in vehicle not justified
by vehicle exception to warrant requirement). See generally I W. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND
SEizuEs, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 11.1 (1982) ("Few areas of search and seizure law
are more confused than automobile stops and searches"); Comment, Search And Seizure.
From CarrollTo Ross, The Odyssey ofthe Automobile Exception, 32 CATH. L. REV. 221, 222
(1982) (vehicle exception as example of difficulty inherent in applying any exception to warrant requirement).
78. See Comment, Extension of Terry Search to Nearby Automobile-United Slates v.
Rainone, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1101, 1112 (1979) (court erred in using search incident to
arrest rationale to extend stop and frisk to vehicle). The commentator continued to criticize
the Rainone court's use of Terry to justify the vehicle area search because it ignores the
distinction between the two types of searches and the use of the Terry balancing test. See id
at 1112-18.
79. Compare Michigan v. Long, - U.S.,
_ 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3480, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201,
1219-20 (1983) (scope limited to area where weapon could be hidden and where suspect
could have immediate control) with United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (scope of
warrantless vehicle search includes any place or container in which object of search could be
concealed) and United States v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (vehicle search incident to
arrest includes entire passenger compartment) and South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364, 373-76 (1976) (pursuant to inventory search, car, including glove compartment, subject
to inspection). See generally Note, Reasonable Suspicion And Probable Cause In Automobile
Searches." A Validity Checklist For Police, Prosecutors,And Defense Attorneys, 40 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 361, 380-82 (1983) (review of automobile searches, standard announced by
Ross).
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stitutional protections.8 0
Paula C. Tredeau
80. See Posner,Rethinking the FourthAmendment, 1981 SuP. CT. REv. 49, 55 ("A standard of reasonableness is inherently rather vague.") The slender reed analogy was used by
Justice Holmes to describe the claim of a state's exclusive authority over migratory birds
based on its claim to title. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).
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